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most-significant-relationshIp doctrine as the 
fallback conflict-of-law rule in the people’s 
republic of china*
Chi Chung**
AbstrAct
Examining statutory law and its application in the People’s Republic of  
China, this article questions the idea that standards are the easier way for 
a jurisdiction to have “better law,” and cautions against the questionable 
exercise of  official discretion, ostensibly authorized by law in the form of  a 
standard. The PRC’s conflict-of-law statute came into effect in 2011. Article 
2, Section 2 sets the most-significant-relationship doctrine as the fallback 
rule for the entire choice-of-law field. In other words, when no other choice-
-of-law rule is applicable in a particular case, a people’s court of  the PRC will 
apply the law of  the place that the PRC court deems to have the most signi-
ficant relationship with the immediate case. Some scholars have considered 
Article 2, Section 2 an important innovation. However, as demonstrated by 
this Article, since Article 2, Section 2 took effect in 2011, it has been applied 
in a questionable manner. Drawing on the rule-versus-standard literature, 
this article cautions against the questionable exercise of  official discretion, 
ostensibly authorized by law in the form of  a standard.
Keywords: conflict of  law rule, choice of  Law, China
1. IntroductIon
By examining a statutory law and its application in the People’s Republic 
of  China,1 this article questions the idea that standards are the easier way 
for a jurisdiction to have “better law,” and cautions against the questionable 
exercise of  official discretion, ostensibly authorized by law in the form of  a 
standard. Article 2, Section 2 of  the PRC’s conflict-of-law statute,2 effective 
since 2011, sets the most-significant-relationship doctrine as the fallback3 
rule for the entire choice-of-law field. In other words, when no other choice-
1 This article discusses the law of  the People’s Republic of  China (PRC), not the law of  
the Republic of  China (ROC) on Taiwan. For more background and discussion on the rela-
tionship between the PRC and the ROC, see e.g., CHI, Chung. International law and the the 
extraordinary interaction between the people’s Republic of  China and the Republic of  China 
on Taiwan. Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, v. 19, n. 2, p. 233-322, 2009.
2 For more discussion of  the PRC’s conflict-of-law statute, see e.g., BASEDOW, Jürgen; 
PIΒLER, Knut B (Ed). Private international law in Mainland China, Taiwan and Europe. 
Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014. 
3 I choose the word “fallback” as the translation of  the Chinese phrase “兜底” (dou di). 
See e.g., LIU, Xiangshu. On the Closest Connection Principle as a Judicial Principle (lun zui 
miqie lianxi de sifa yuanze hua), Modern Law Science (xiandai faxue), v. 34 , p.132, 2012. The word 
“fallback” is also used by Joseph Singer, a scholar in the United States; see infra note 54 and 
accompanying text.
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-of-law rule is applicable in a particular case, a people’s 
court of  the PRC will apply the law of  the place that 
the PRC court deems to have the most significant rela-
tionship with the immediate case. Some scholars con-
sidered Article 2, Section 2 an important innovation. 
However, as demonstrated by this article, since Article 
2, Section 2 took effect in 2011, it has been applied in a 
questionable manner. Drawing on the rule-versus-stan-
dard literature, this article cautions against the questio-
nable exercise of  official discretion ostensibly authori-
zed by law in the form of  a standard. Put differently, 
it may seem reasonable to distill the abstract idea that 
the most-significant-relationship doctrine animates the 
whole field of  choice of  law, but such an abstract idea 
should be refined to suit the needs of  a contemporary 
society for certainty and predictability.
The phrase “better law” in the title of  this article 
warrants more explanation. In the United States, the 
phrase “better law” was used in debates in the 1980s 
on the choice-of-law methodology.4 This article uses 
the phrase “better law” to refer to the degree to which 
a particular legal rule is desirable. As will be argued in 
the following pages, there is no easier way to design a 
desirable legal rule.
2. the Prc’s FAllbAck conFlIct-oF-lAw 
rule
For the purpose of  building a legal system after its 
Cultural Revolution,5 the PRC rapidly enacted many 
statutes and promulgated many regulations, created go-
vernment institutions to make and apply the law, and 
educated a significant number of  lawyers.6 To shorten 
the learning curve, the PRC has looked to other states 
for example and advice, and some foreign states and 
individuals do offer advice to the PRC.7 Although ad-
4 See infra notes 56 and accompanying text.
5 For more about the PRC’s Cultural Revolution, see e.g., MAC-
FARQUHAR, Roderick; SCHOENHALS, Michael. Mao’s Last Revo-
lution. Harvard: Harvard University, 2006).
6 See e.g., The Evolution of  Law Reform in China: An Uncertain 
Path (Stanley B. Lubman ed., 2012); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a 
Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (1999); Jianfu Chen, Chi-
nese Law: Context and Transformation (2008); Pitman B. Potter, 
China’s Legal System (2013); Law and Institutions of  Modern China 
(Sanzhu Zhu ed., 2011); Ronald C. Keith et al. eds., China’s Supreme 
Court (2014).
7 See e.g., William P. Alford, Of  Lawyers Lost and Found: Search-
vised by foreigners, the PRC undoubtedly has the final 
say on the design of  its own legal institutions and has to 
make its own decisions, of  which the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine is a vivid example.
2.1. The “Innovative” Statutory Fallback Rule
Scholars and officials in the PRC did not invent the 
most-significant-relationship doctrine; instead, it is a 
well-established doctrine in the field of  the choice of  
law.8 For example, in the United States, in Restatement 
(Second) of  Conflict of  Laws, § 6 “Choice-of-Law 
Principles,” published by the American Law Institute, 
consists of  two subsections:
(1) A Court, subject to constitutional restrictions, 
will follow a statutory directive of  its own state on choi-
ce of  law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors rele-
vant to the choice of  the applicable rule of  law include
(a) the needs of  the interstate and international sys-
tems,
(b) the relevant policies of  the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of  other interested states 
and the relative interests of  those states in the determi-
nation of  the particular issue,
(d) the protection of  justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field 
of  law, 
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of  result, 
and
(g) ease in the determination and application of  the 
law to be applied.
ing for Legal Professionalism in the People’s Republic of  China, in 
East Asian Law: Universal Norms and Local Cultures 182 (Arthur 
Rosett et al. eds., 2003); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United 
States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change 
in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. Pa J. Int’l Econ. 
L. 179 (1999); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse behind Chi-
nese Walls? Problems and Prospects of  U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of  
Law’ Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of  China, 18 UCLA 
Pac. Basin L.J. 64 (2000) (describing foreign legal assistance and its 
accompanying problems). 
8 Although the most-significant-relationship doctrine is well 
established in the field of  choice of  law, it was not the approach 
adopted in the First Restatement. See e.g., RICHMAN, William M; 
REYNOLDS, William L. Understanding Conflict of  Laws. 3. ed. rev. 
Lexisnexis, 2002. p. 182-83, 205-09.
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Despite its well-established status, the most-signi-
ficant-relationship doctrine as stipulated in Article 2, 
Section 2 of  the PRC’s conflict-of-law statute (effective 
since 2011), is unique in setting the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine as the fallback rule for the entire 
field of  the choice of  law. When no other choice-of-
-law rule is applicable in a particular case, a PRC court 
applies the law of  the place that the PRC court deems 
to have the most significant relationship with the imme-
diate case. 9 
The PRC’s conflict-of-law statute (effective since 
2011) is the Law of  the People’s Republic of  China 
on Application of  Laws to Foreign-Related Civil Rela-
tions10 (zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shewai minshi guanxi falu 
shiyong fa; hereafter referred to as the Statute on FRCR). 
The Statute on FRCR was promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of  the National People’s Congress (quanguo 
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuan hui), and made public 
by Order No. 36 of  the President of  the People’s Repu-
blic of  China on October 28, 2010.11 It went into effect 
on April 1, 2011.12
The Statute on FRCR consists of  eight chapters: 
(1) general provisions; (2) subjects of  civil relations;13 
9 It should be noted that Article 2, Section 2 is not the only oc-
currence of  the most-significant-relationship doctrine in the Statute. 
Article 6 states, “In the event that laws of  a given foreign country 
apply to the foreign-related civil relation in question, if  different 
regions of  the foreign country are governed by different laws, laws 
of  the region having the most significant relationship with the for-
eign-related civil relation shall apply.” Article 19 states, “In the event 
that lex patriae applies in accordance with this Law, where a natural 
person has two (2) or more nationalities, lex patriae of  the country 
with his/her habitual residence shall apply; where no country of  
nationality has his/her habitual residence, lex patriae of  the country 
having the most significant relationship with him/her shall apply. 
In the case of  stateless natural persons or natural persons without 
clear nationality, laws of  their habitual residence shall apply.” Article 
39 states, “In the case of  marketable securities, laws of  the place 
of  realization of  the rights of  such securities or other laws hav-
ing the most significant relationship with the securities shall apply.” 
Article 41 states that “The parties concerned may choose the laws 
applicable to a contract by agreement. Where the parties have made 
no such choice, laws of  the habitual residence of  the party whose 
performance of  obligations best reflects the characteristics of  the 
contract or other laws having the most significant relationship with 
the contract shall apply.”
10 THE TRANSLATION was done by Westlaw China (Wan Lu). 
Available: <http://www.westlawchina.com/>. Access on: 19 Mar. 
2016), a commercial publisher. The translation is not official and has 
no legal effect. Only the Chinese version is legally binding.
11 The President of  the People’s Republic of  China, on October 
28, 2010, was Hu Jintao. See also supra note 10.
12 See supra note 10.
13 Westlaw China translates the title of  the second chapter—Min-
(3) marriage and family; (4) succession; (5) property ri-
ghts; (6) creditor’s rights; (7) intellectual property rights; 
and (8) supplementary provisions. Article 2 consists of  
two sections. Section 1 states that “Laws applicable to 
foreign-related civil relations shall be determined in ac-
cordance with this Law,” and that “provisions on the 
application of  laws to foreign-related civil relations 
otherwise prescribed in other laws shall prevail.” Sec-
tion 2 states that “In the absence of  provisions on the 
application of  laws to foreign-related civil relations as 
prescribed in this Law and other laws, laws having the 
most significant relationship with the foreign-related ci-
vil relation in question shall apply.”
According to Mo Zhang, associate professor at the 
Temple University School of  Law, the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine, sometimes referred to as the 
closest connection principle in the relevant literature, 
was first introduced in the PRC as a choice of  law rule 
in the PRC’s 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law.14 
The 1985 Foreign Economic Contract Law was later 
replaced by the Contract Law.15 The 1986 Civil Code, 
meanwhile, applied the most-significant-relationship 
doctrine to family maintenance.16 The PRC’s 1999 Con-
tract Law also provides that, where the parties have not 
chosen a law to apply in contractual disputes, the law 
of  the country to which the contract is most closely 
connected shall apply.17 Although the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine was previously part of  the PRC’s 
law, it was not the fallback rule for the entire field of  
choice of  law until the 2011 enactment of  the Statute 
on FRCR.
Some scholars claim that the PRC’s enactment of  
the Statute on FRCR made a significant contribution 
to legal scholarship by designating the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine the fallback rule for the entire 
field of  choice of  law. For example, Guangjian Tu, as-
sistant professor at the School of  Law, University of  
Macau opines that “[o]ne of  the most important in-
novations found in this new legislation is that the clo-
shi Zhuti—as “civil subjects.” See supra note 10. I think “subjects of  
civil relations” would be a better translation.
14 ZHANG, Mo. Codified choice of  law in china: rules, processes 
and theoretic underpinnings. Journal of  International Law and Commer-
cial Regulation, North Carolina, v. 37, n. 1, p. 83-101, 2011.
15 YU Shuhong; XIAO Yongping; WANG Baoshi. The closest 
connection doctrine in the conflict of  laws in China, v. 8, n.2, p. 
423-439, June 2009.
16 ZHANG, supra note 15.
17 ZHANG, supra note 15.
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sest connection test has been expressly established as a 
salient principle for the whole system.”18 To consider 
another example, Mo Zhang, associate professor at the 
Temple University School of  Law, opines that “[i]n con-
trast to previous choice of  law legislation in China, the 
Choice of  Law Statute [i.e. the Statute on FRCR] rai-
ses the level of  importance of  the ‘closest connection’ 
rule from a specific provision to a principle of  general 
application.”19
Although Tu recognizes Article 2, Section 2 of  the 
FRCR as one of  the most important innovations, he 
had reservations about its application in the PRC courts:
While it may be true, as many said during the rea-
ding of  the drafts, that the introduction of  the closest 
connection principle as basic to the whole system is the 
modern trend, one may question how effectively this 
test can be applied by courts in practice. Given that 
Chinese judges are normally not experienced in dealing 
with foreign-related cases, it was argued, and has been 
shown, that this test has been applied unsatisfactorily 
in the context of  contract law where China first intro-
duced it. The expansion of  this open-ended test would 
surely be a challenge for many inexperienced Chinese 
judges when confronted with foreign-related cases.
In a 2009 article in Chinese Journal of  Internatio-
nal Law, three scholars teaching in the Law School of  
Wuhan University, China, suggested that the PRC, in its 
future legislation, should “adopt the closest connection 
doctrine [i.e., the most-significant-relationship doctrine] 
as a general principle.”20 Their suggestion, however, was 
not based on a positive assessment of  the performance 
of  the closest connection principle in Chinese courts. 
Instead, they offer a rather scathing criticism of  the clo-
sest connection principle as applied in PRC courts:21
Generally Chinese courts decide the country of  
closest connection based on contacts counting. The 
Chinese courts usually list the contacts with China. 
They neither study the contacts with other countries 
nor compare the quality and weight of  each contact. 
Furthermore, there is a “forum-oriented” tendency in 
Chinese judicial practice. The above-mentioned cases 
18 TU, Guangjian. China’s new conflicts code: general issues and 
selected topics. American Journal of  Comparative Law, v. 59, n. 2, p. 563-
590, spring 2011. p. 566.
19 See ZHANG, supra note 15, 101-102 (2011).
20 See YU et al., supra note 16.
21 See YU et al., supra note 16, at 436-37.
demonstrate that forum law is usually applied under the 
closest connection rule…
After this criticism, however, the three authors offer 
a short paragraph that purports to justify the PRC 
courts’ practice:22
In addition to the reason of  promotion of  natio-
nal interests, the application of  the lex fori can usually 
be justified by other interests. Sometimes it is argued 
that the lex fori provides the best results for the parties 
from the point of  view of  substantive law. It may also 
have procedural advantages. Therefore, the application 
of  this rule usually leads to the application of  Chinese 
law in practice.
Then, the three authors state that “[t]he closest con-
nection doctrine [the most-significant-relationship doc-
trine] plays a very important role in Chinese law”23 and 
that “[w]e take the view that this rule may be taken as a 
general principle on the choice of  law in future Chinese 
legislation.”24
2.2. The Cases Where the Fallback Rule Was 
Applied
Since 2011, the year in which Article 2, Section 2 
took effect, it was applied in approximately a dozen ca-
ses.25 In the following pages, I will divide these cases 
into three categories.
The first category concerns foreign-related contracts 
to which Article 41 of  the FRCR (instead of  Article 2, 
Section 2) should have been applied. In a representative 
case concerning a franchise contract, the plaintiff  was 
a corporation in Shanghai City and the defendant was 
a resident of  Taiwan.26 The court found that the plain-
tiff  and defendant signed a franchise contract (chengbao 
jingying xieyi) on December 31, 2010, in which the plain-
tiff  authorized the defendant to operate its photogra-
phy department, offered a house for the operation, and 
22 See YU et al., supra note 16, at 437.
23 See YU et al., supra note 16, at 437.
24 See YU et al., supra note 16, at 437.
25 As the PRC has no centralized reporting system for court cases, 
I have to rely on databases created by the private sector. When us-
ing Westlaw China (wanlu) with “the FRCR” (shewai minshi guanxi falu 
shiyong fa) and “the closest connection” (zui miqie lianxi) as keywords, 
only a few cases mention Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR.
26 Chang Min Er Shang Chu Zi Judgment N. 26 (People’s Ct. of  
the Changning District, Shanghai City, June 12, 2012) Lawyee. Avail-
able in: <http://www.lawyee.net>. Access: Fe. 13, 2016). (P.R.C.).
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received from the defendant RMB$1,500,000 annually. 
The defendant defaulted on the contract in September 
2011 and the plaintiff  sued the defendant on December 
27, 2011. The court’s analysis of  the choice-of-law issue 
was short. The court stated that “the current case is a 
Taiwan-related business franchise contract dispute,”27 
that “the place of  performance as stipulated in the 
contract between plaintiff  and defendant is Shanghai 
City,”28 and that “in accordance with the closest con-
nection principle... the law of  the People’s Republic of  
China should be applied in the current case.”29 Then, 
at the end of  the judgment, the court cited Article 2, 
Section 2 of  the FRCR, instead of  Article 41.
As stated earlier, Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR is 
a fallback rule, applicable only when no other choice-of-
-law rule applies. Instead of  applying Article 2, Section 
2, the PRC court should have applied Article 41 of  the 
FRCR. Certainly, the most-significant-relationship doc-
trine appears in Article 41 as a directive for PRC courts 
when the parties to the contract do not choose the ap-
plicable law by mutual agreement.30 Nonetheless, the 
most-significant-relationship doctrine in Article 2 and 
that in Article 41 are different in terms of  their scope 
and effects. The same problem also appears in a judg-
ment delivered by the First Intermediate People’s Court 
of  Shanghai City31 and a judgment delivered by the High 
People’s Court for Fujian Province.32 In a judgment de-
livered by the People’s Court of  the Changning District, 
Shanghai City, in 2013, the court cited both Article 2 
and Article 41, but this contradicts their irreconcilable 
language.33 The correct34 approach, I suggest, is to cite 
27 The original text is as follows: ben an xi shetai qiye chengbao jingying 
hetong jiufen.
28 The original text is as follows: yin yuan bei gao shuang fang hetong 
luxing di zai shanghai shi.
29 The original text is as follows: gu genju zhui miqie lianxi yuanze . . 
. ben an yingdang shiyong zhonghua renmin gonghe guo falu.
30 See supra note 9 for the language of  Article 41 of  the FRCR.
31 Hu Yi Zhong Min Si Shang Zhong Zi Judgment No. S2132 
(The First Intermediate People’s Ct. of  Shanghai City, February 21, 
2014) Westlaw China (wanlu). Available in: <http://www.westlawchi-
na.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.).
32 Min Min Zhong Zi Judgment No. 190 (High People’s Ct. of  
Fujian Province, May 17, 2011) Westlaw China (wanlu), Available in: 
<http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.).
33 Zhang Min Er Shang Chu Zi Judgment No. S808, (People’s 
Ct. of  the Changning District, Shanghai City) Westlaw China (wanlu). 
Available in: <http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 
2016) (P.R.C.).
34 The word “correct” is chosen to denote the range of  interpre-
tation permitted by the language of  Articles 2 and 41. I am not urg-
ing a strict style of  reasoning by the method of  deduction. 
only Article 41 when choosing the applicable law for 
foreign-related contracts. In fact, the PRC courts have 
done so in a number of  judgments.35
The second category concerns disputes arising from 
share transfers (guquan zhuanrang jiufen). In a judgment 
delivered on October 14, 2011, the High People’s Court 
of  Tianjin applied Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR as 
a critical step in its choice-of-law analysis.36 In this case, 
the plaintiff  sued a corporation (hereafter referred to as 
the defendant-corporation) and its sole (duzi) shareholder 
(hereafter referred to as the defendant-shareholder), clai-
ming that the plaintiff, instead of  the defendant-sharehol-
der, was the sole shareholder of  the defendant-corpora-
tion. The court stated that, because one of  the defendants 
was incorporated in the State of  Samoa (samoya duli guo), 
the subject (zhuti) was foreign-related37 and that, therefo-
re, jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues should be decided 
in accordance with the rules that govern foreign-related 
civil relations. The court added that the case was a “dis-
pute about the shareholder status”38 and opined that “no 
choice-of-law rules exist for that type of  legal relationship 
in the law of  our country.”39 The court, therefore, applied 
Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR, stating that because the 
plaintiff  and defendant-corporation were “resident in the 
People’s Republic of  China,”40 the law of  the People’s 
Republic of  China should be applied. The court ruled 
against the plaintiff  due to lack of  sufficient evidence.
The court’s reasoning in this instance is questiona-
ble. Article 14, Section 1 of  the FRCR provides that: 
[l]aws of  the registration place shall apply to the 
capacity for civil rights, capacity for civil conduct, 
organization structure, shareholders’ rights and 
obligations and other matters of  a legal person and 
the branch offices thereof.41 
35 An example is: Pu Min Er Shang Chu Zi Judgment No. S292 
(People’s Court of  the Putuo District, Shanghai City) Westlaw China 
(wanlu). Available in: <http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: 
Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.).
36 Jin Gao Min Si Zhong Zi Judgment No. 28 (High People’s Ct. 
of  the Tianjin City, October 14, 2011) Westlaw China (wanlu), Avail-
able in: <http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Febr. 13, 2016) 
(P.R.C.).
37 The word “foreign-related” in Chinese is as follows: juyou shewai 
yinsu.
38 The original text is as follows: gudong zige queren jiufen.
39 The original text is as follows: gaizhong falu guanxi de zhunju 
fa shiyong woguo falu meiyou xiangying de chongtu guifan yuyi 
guiding.
40 The original text is as follows: zhusuo di junzai zhonghua ren-
min gonghe guo jingnei.
41 This is the translation provided by Wanlu, the commercial 
publisher, and therefore not legally binding. The Romanization of  
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The plaintiff  sued the defendants—a corporation 
and its sole shareholder—to assert his rights and obliga-
tions as the sole shareholder of  one of  the defendants. 
This fits well with the language of  Article 14, Section 
1 of  the FRCR. Even though the plaintiff  sought to 
assert his rights as a shareholder of  the defendant-
-corporation, the defendants disputed this status. This 
may have affected the PRC court’s decision on whether 
Article 14, Section 1 could be applied. Nonetheless, it 
would be better if  such issues were explicitly discussed 
in the judgment. Four other judgments have been ren-
dered that apply Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR in a 
similar fashion.42 In one judgment between a Japanese 
buyer and a Japanese seller of  the shares of  a corpo-
ration that was incorporated in the PRC, PRC law was 
determined to be applicable on the basis of  Article 41 
of  the FRCR rather than on the basis of  Article 2 of  
the FRCR.43 As noted earlier, Article 41 applies to dis-
putes that arise from contractual relationships; therefo-
re, in applying Article 41, the PRC court characterized 
the case as one arising from a contractual relationship. 
In other words, since the PRC court found a rule in the 
FRCR that could be applied, it did not apply Article 2, 
the fallback rule.
The third category concerns the characterization 
issue. In a judgment delivered by High People’s Court 
for Beijing City, the plaintiff  (creditor) claimed that the 
defendant, as a controlling shareholder of  the corpo-
ration (debtor), hurt the rights of  the plaintiff.44 The 
Article 14, Section 1 is as follows: faren ji qi fenzhi jigou de minshi 
quanli nengli minshi xingwei nengli zhzhi jigou gudong quanli yiwu 
deng shixiang shiyong dengji di falu.
42 Yu Gao Fa Min Zhong Zi Judgment No. 119 (High People’s 
Court for Chongqing City, September 19, 2011), Westlaw China 
(wanlu), Available in: <http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: 
Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.); Da Min Si Chu Zi Judgment No. 32 (Inter-
mediate People’s Court for Dalian City, Liaoning Province, Janu-
ary 22, 2013), Westlaw China (wanlu), Available in: <http://www.
westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.); Zhe Shang 
Wai ZHong Zi Judgment No. 73 (High People’s Court for Zhejiang 
Province, November 28, 2013), Westlaw China (wanlu). Available in: 
<http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.); 
Yue Gao Fa Min Si Zhong Zi Judgment No. 13 (High People’s Court 
for Guangdong Province, March 20, 2014), Westlaw China (wanlu). 
Available in: <http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 
2016) (P.R.C.).
43 Hu Yi Zhong Min Si Shang Zhong Zi Judgment No. S117 
(First Intermediate People’s Court of  Shanghai City, April 10, 2012), 
Westlaw China (wanlu). Available in: <http://www.westlawchina.
com>. Access: Feb.13, 2016) (P.R.C.).
44 Gao Min Zhong Zi Judgment No. 1272 (High People’s Court 
of  Beijing City, December 2013), Westlaw China (wanlu). Available in: 
<http://www.westlawchina.com>. Access: Feb. 13, 2016) (P.R.C.).
plaintiff  relied on Article 20 of  the PRC’s Corporation 
Law; the court asserted that, in accordance with Article 
2, Section 2 of  the FRCR, the PRC law was most closely 
connected to the case and should, therefore, be applied. 
The reason that Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR was 
needed, in the opinion of  this article, is that the court 
cannot comfortably characterize the case and also apply 
the choice-of-law rules set out in the FRCR. Since the 
loan contract existed between the plaintiff  and the cor-
poration, not between the plaintiff  and the defendant, 
it was less possible for the court to characterize the case 
as a contract and then apply Article 41. However, it is 
not so unimaginable to characterize the case in such a 
way that the choice-of-law rules in the FRCR may be 
readily applicable. If  the court characterizes the case 
as one for tort liabilities, then it should apply Article 
44 of  the FRCR. If  it characterizes the case as one of  
shareholder’s obligations, then it should apply Article 
14. In accordance with PRC law, pursuant to Article 
8 of  the FRCR, should have been decided upon such 
characterization issues, by the High People’s Court for 
Beijing City. Instead, the High People’s Court for Bei-
jing City chose to resort to Article 2, Section 2; the jud-
gment itself  does not explain how the court addressed 
the characterization issue, and, by extension, why Arti-
cles 44 and Article 14 cannot be applied.
In short, Article 2, Section 2 and its current applica-
tion by the PRC’s courts does not seem consistent. The 
lessons that we may derive from Article 2, Section 2 and 
its current application by the PRC’s courts, however, are 
deeper and broader.
3. between stAndArds And rules
3.1. Standards and Rules Abstractly Compared
The earliest scholarship comparing standards and 
rules seems to be that published by Roscoe Pound in 
1922.45 Pound was concerned with the application of  
45 The earliest discussion found by Louis Kaplow is in POUND, 
Roscoe. An Introduction to the Philosophy of  Law. New Jersey: 
The Lawbook Exchange, 1922. p.115-123;  KAPLOW, Louis. Rules 
Versus Standards: an economic analysis, Duke Law Journal. v. 42, p. 
557-629, 1992. Pound was an important scholar in the United States 
and was influential in the Republican period of  China. See e.g., KRO-
NCKE, Jedidiah J. Roscoe Pond in China: a lost precedent for the 
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law and pointed out that “unless the word rule is used 
in so wide a sense as to be misleading, such a definition, 
framed with reference to codes or by jurists whose eyes 
were fixed upon the law of  property, gives an inadequa-
te picture of  the manifold components of  a modern 
legal system.”46 Rules, he argued, are “definite, detailed 
provisions for definite detailed states of  fact.”47 He con-
tinued by proposing that, “three characteristics may be 
seen in legal standards: 
(1) They all involve a certain moral judgment upon 
conduct. It is to be ‘fair,’ or ‘conscientious,’ or ‘reasona-
ble,’ or ‘prudent,’ or ‘diligent.’ 
(2) They do not call for exact legal knowledge exactly 
applied, but for common sense about common things 
or trained intuition about things outside of  everyone’s 
experience. 
(3) They are not formulated absolutely and given an 
exact content, either by legislation or by judicial deci-
sion, but are relative to times and places and circums-
tances and are to be applied with reference to the facts 
of  the case in hand.”48
Turning to choice-of-law scholarship, Professor 
Willis L.M. Reese, a Columbia University professor 
and Reporter for Restatement (Second) of  Conflict of  
Laws, wrote in 1972 that “[t]he principal question in 
choice of  law today is whether we should have rules or 
an approach.”49 Reese defines a “rule” as a “a formula 
which once applied will lead the court to a conclusion”50 
and an “approach” as “a system which does no more 
than state what factor or factors should be considered 
in arriving at a conclusion.”51 Reese stresses that the 
time for precise rules has not come for certain areas:52
liabilities of  american legal exceptionalism. Brooklyn Journal of  Inter-
national Law, v. 38,  n. 1, p.1-67, 2012. Pound’s discussion of  rules 
and standards dates back to the Roman jurist Cicero.
46 POUND, supra note 46, at 115.
47 POUND, supra note 46, at 115.
48 POUND, supra note 46, at 118.
49 REESE, Willis L. M. Choice of  Law: rules or approach. Cornell 
Law Review, v. 57, n. 3, p. 315-334, Feb. 1972. p. 318-319. 
50 See REESE, supra note 50, at 315.
51 See REESE, supra note 50, at 315.
52 As set out earlier, Section 6 of  the Restatement (Second) lists 
a number of  factors that a court should consider when deciding 
the choice-of-law issues. In the “Comment on Subsection (2),” the 
Reporter of  the Second Restatement states the following:
  Those chapters in the Restatement of  this Subject which are 
concerned with choice of  law state the rules which the courts have 
evolved in accommodation of  the factors listed in this Subsection. 
In certain areas, as in parts of  Property (Chapter 9), such rules are 
All that can presently be done in these areas [where 
the difficulties and complexities involved have preven-
ted the courts from formulating a precise rule] is to sta-
te a general principle, such as application of  the local 
law “of  the state of  most significant relationship”, whi-
ch provides some clue to the correct approach but does 
not furnish precise answers. In these areas, the courts 
must look in each case to the underlying factors the-
mselves in order to arrive at a decision which will best 
accommodate them. 
Discussing the relationship between policy and law 
and urging courts to develop rules that best accommo-
date multistate and local law policies Willis Reese wrote 
the following in 1972:53
Policies underlie and are responsible for all rules of  
law. It is the policy which first comes to light. Thereaf-
ter, the policy may be embodied in a statute or it may 
be given effect by judicial decision. Policies are difficult 
to apply in their raw state, since their proper range of  
application may be uncertain. Even more importantly, 
a policy rarely stands alone; there will usually be one or 
more countervailing policies and consequently there will 
be the problem of  determining the extent to which one 
policy should be furthered at the expense of  another. 
The task of  defining the policy’s scope of  application 
or of  providing proper accommodation for conflicting 
policies bears close analogy to the choice of  law pro-
blem of  determining how best to accommodate mul-
tistate and local law policies, including the question of  
which state has the greatest concern in the decision of  
the particular issue. In at least most areas of  the law, the 
constant aim of  the courts has been to translate policies 
into rules as quickly as possible for the reason, among 
others, that rules are more precise and hence provide 
greater certainty and predictability than do policies and 
also are far easier for the courts to apply. Should the aim 
of  the courts not be the same in choice of  law?
No, scholars and legislators in the PRC do not com-
pare rules and policies in the way Reese did; they simply 
have not discussed the subject that way. In order to ex-
sufficiently precise to permit them to be applied in the decision of  
a case without explicit reference to the factors which underlie them. 
In other areas, such as Wrongs (Chapter 7) and Contracts (Chapter 
8), the difficulties and complexities involved have as yet prevented 
the courts from formulating a precise rule, or series of  rules, which 
provide a satisfactory accommodation of  the underlying factors in 
all of  the situations which may arise. 
53 See supra note 50, at 318-19.
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plain their difference, I propose the following hypothe-
sis: Scholars and legislators in the PRC are tasked with 
designing rules, not making policies. First of  all, PRC 
courts cannot “translate policies into rules” as courts 
in the United States do. Secondly, policymaking in the 
PRC remains more sensitive than “rule-designing” or 
“rule-applying.” Given the above-mentioned absence 
of  precise rules on some issues, it seems reasonable to 
design Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR to provide a 
fallback rule for the entire field of  choice of  law. 
Moreover, scholars and legislators in the PRC are 
not alone in proposing a fallback rule for the entire 
field of  choice of  law. Joseph William Singer, a pro-
fessor at Harvard Law School, wrote in 1991 that, sin-
ce choice law is not likely to construct “principles that 
will govern all kinds of  cases,”54 it is crucial to have a 
fallback position when no principle applies to govern 
the case.”55 In an article published in 1989, Joseph Wi-
lliam Singer, a professor at Harvard Law School, argued 
that the difference between rules and standards, albeit 
significant, is “much less than is commonly supposed; 
whatever method we adopt in real world disputes will 
necessarily combine rules and standards.”56 On the one 
hand, Singer argued that rule systems require standar-
ds, since rule systems create characterization problems, 
cannot be comprehensive, work only as long as they ac-
cord with contemporary notions of  social justice, and 
employ standards as exceptions or as supplements.57 At 
the same time, he argued that standards generate rules 
through both the development of  case law over time 
and the practice of  law by lawyers.58
Singer, therefore, argued for a “better law” approach 
for adjudicating conflict-of-law cases. Singer’s argument 
rests on two bases. The first is a factual one. Singer ar-
gued that “most courts consider, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, which set of  applicable laws is better as a matter 
of  social policy and justice.”59 The second basis rests 
on a combination of  factual and normative dimensions. 
54 SINGER, Joseph William. Facing real conflicts. Cornell Interna-
tional Law Jounal, v. 24, p. 197-200, Spring, 1991.
55 SINGER, Joseph William. Facing real conflicts. Cornell Interna-
tional Law Jounal, v. 24, p. 197-200, Spring, 1991.
56 SINGER, Joseph William. Real Conflicts. Boston University Law 
Review, v. 69, n. 3, Jan. 1989. p. 7-8. It should be noted that Singer 
used the word “we” to describe his colleagues in the United States, 
not conflict-of-law scholars in other places.
57 Id, at 9-19.
58 Id, at 19-22.
59 SINGER, Joseph William. A pragmatic guide to conflicts. Bos-
ton University Law Review, v. 70, p. 731-735, Nov. 1990.
Singer argued that “there is no way to determine the 
basic policy of  an entire field of  law, like torts or con-
tracts, without making value judgments about which 
substantive policies should be favored; that is, without 
identifying the better law.”60 Put differently, the better 
law approach directs judges to consider, when adjudica-
ting conflict-of-law cases, which set of  applicable laws 
is better as a matter of  social policy and justice. Fur-
ther, Singer is not alone in the academia to argue for 
the better law approach.61 Some scholars argue that, in 
terms of  the forms of  law, standards are better than 
rules. It should be noted, though, that Singer states that 
the debate between rules and standards is not as real or 
useful as it appears. Singer is also in support of  the ideal 
of  the rule of  law. The simple statement that standards 
are better than rules runs the risk of  oversimplification. 
However, when PRC law treats the most-significant-
-relationship doctrine as the fallback rule for the whole 
field of  choice of  law, and some scholars reach the con-
clusion that it is an “innovation,” they prefer standards 
to rules.
Value judgments, Singer argued, are necessary. As 
discussed earlier, the Second Restatement sets out the 
concept of  “basic policies underlying the particular field 
of  law.”62 Willis L. M. Reese, a professor at Columbia 
University and Reporter for Restatement (Second) of  
Conflict of  Laws, wrote in 1982 that “the basic policy 
underlying most areas of  torts is to afford compensation 
to the plaintiff  and, thus, by reason of  the prevalence 
of  liability insurance, to spread the risk of  loss.”63 Reese 
also wrote in 1982 that “[t]he basic policy in the field of  
contracts is to protect the justified expectations of  the 
parties.”64 In 1989, Singer disagreed, holding that “the 
60 SINGER, Joseph William. A pragmatic guide to conflicts. Bos-
ton University Law Review, v. 70, p. 731-735, Nov. 1990. 
61 Id, at footnote 14, Singer cites the following authorities: 
WEINBERG, Louise. On Departing from Forum Law. Mercer Law 
Review, v. 35, n. 595, p. 600-635, 1984. p. 600; WEINTRAUB, Rus-
sell. Commentary on the Conflict of  Laws, §6.27, at 342-45. 3. ed. 
Califórnia: Foudation, 1986; REESE, Willis. The Law Governing 
Airplane Accidents. Washington and Lee Law Review, v. 39, n. 4, p. 
1303-1323, Jan. 1982. p. 1305 (1982).
62 See Restatement (Second) of  Conflict of  Laws § 6(2)(e) (1971).
63 REESE, supra note 61, at 1305.
64 Id. Some of  these policies are discussed by Reese, the Reporter 
of  the Second Restatement, in the “Comment on Subsection (2)”:
  Legislatures usually legislate, and courts usually adjudicate, only 
with the local situation in mind. They rarely give thought to the 
extent to which the laws they enact, and the common law rules they 
enunciate, should apply to out-of-state facts. When there are no ad-
equate directives in the state or in the case law, the court will take 
account of  the factors listed in this Subsection in determining the 
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law of  torts represents a compromise between the poli-
cy of  requiring people to compensate others when they 
harm them and the policy [of] allowing people to act 
freely without regard to the interests of  others.”65 Sin-
ger added that contract law constitutes “a compromise 
between the policy of  regulating agreements as a way to 
promote social goals, protecting the actual—rather than 
the formally expressed—expectations of  the parties or 
limiting the ability of  powerful persons to coerce vulne-
rable persons to enter onerous arrangements.”66 Singer 
also argued that states “do not have a shared policy, and 
it is misleading to pretend that they do.”67 
After identifying the policies that underlie these le-
gal rules, Singer proposed that judges investigate which 
policies should prevail in the particular cases, explaining 
his reasons as follows:68
The proper way to analyze the policies underlying 
the conflicting substantive laws in a conflicts case is 
to be generous and honest in recognizing the conflic-
ting state and individual interests. We should recogni-
ze that one state’s compensation and deterrence policy 
conflicts with the other state’s policy of  freeing actors 
from the threat of  ruinous liability. One state’s policy 
of  enforcing agreements conflicts with the other state’s 
policy of  regulating its market arrangements to prevent 
undue coercion or to promote various social goals. We 
should recognize these conflicting interests first. Once 
we have done this, we can ask which policy should pre-
vail in these kinds of  cases, and why.
state whose local law will be applied to determine the issue at hand.
Varying weight will be given to a particular factor, or to a group 
of  factors, in different areas of  choice of  law. So, for example, the 
policy in favor of  effectuating the relevant policies of  the state of  
dominant interest is given predominant weight in the rule that trans-
fers of  interests in land are governed by the law that would be ap-
plied by the courts of  the situs (see §§223-243). On the other hand, 
the policies in favor of  protecting the justified expectations of  the 
parties and of  effectuating the basic policy underlying the particular 
field of  law come to the fore in the rule that, subject to certain limi-
tations, the parties can choose the law to govern their contract (see 
§187) and in the rules which provide, subject to certain limitations, 
for the application of  a law which will uphold the validity of  a trust 
of  movables (see §§269-270) or the validity of  a contract against the 
charge of  commercial usury (see §203). Similarly, the policy favoring 
uniformity of  result comes to the fore in the rule that succession to 
interests in movables is governed by the law that would be applied 
by the courts of  the state where the decedent was domiciled at the 
time of  his death (see §§260 and 263).
65 SINGER, Real Conflicts, supra note 56, at 46.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id, at 48.
Although Singer based his analysis on the context 
of  the United States, where there are inter-state con-
flicts between the laws of  the states, his call for candid 
recognition of  conflicting interests and policies resona-
tes well internationally. While the context of  this article 
differs from the context from which Singer drew his 
analysis, there are still conflicting interests and a tenden-
cy to mask these conflicting interests. In the court jud-
gments discussed earlier, some PRC courts avoided ap-
plying the precise rules of  the FRCR and chose to apply 
Article 2 instead. If  it is a result of  deliberate avoidance, 
then Article 2 serves to help some PRC judges mask 
their true beliefs when rendering the judgments. If  it is 
a result of  inadvertent mistakes, then the characteristics 
of  standards such as the most-significant-relationship 
identified by Pound in 1922 help explain such mistakes. 
Article 2 may require more intuition about the “most 
significant relationship” than “exact legal knowledge,” 
and, as such, Article 2 also serves to help some PRC 
judgments mask their true beliefs when rendering the 
judgments.
It should be noted that most scholars cited so far are 
concerned primarily with the context of  the United Sta-
tes. In the next section, I will draw upon their discussion 
of  the U.S. law to reflect upon the PRC context. 
3.2. The Standard/Rule Comparison and the 
PRC’s Fallback Rule
As stated earlier, Pound posited that three characte-
ristics are generally found in legal standards. The most-
-significant-relationship doctrine in Article 2, Section 2 
of  the PRC’s FRCR does not involve a moral judgment 
as clear as “fair,” or “reasonable,” but it does involve the 
idea that it is more legitimate than otherwise to consider 
the law of  the jurisdiction whose relationship to the im-
mediate case is most significant. The application of  the 
most-significant-relationship doctrine does not call for 
exact legal knowledge, at least as demonstrated by the 
cases discussed earlier, but, rather, for “common sense 
about common things or trained intuition about things 
outside of  everyone’s experience.”69 
As described earlier, Singer argued that standards ge-
nerate rules through both the development of  case law 
over time and the practice of  law by lawyers. Singer’s 
argument does not seem to travel from the U.S. con-
69 See POUND supra note 46, at 118.
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text to the PRC context. First, the PRC legal system, 
unlike the U.S. system, does not have a stare decisis doc-
trine.70 Second, if  the PRC courts are not sufficiently 
predictable in applying the PRC law, then it would be 
fairly difficult for PRC lawyers to predict what the PRC 
courts would do in adjudication. In the first category 
of  cases, those that concern foreign-related contracts, 
the PRC courts should have applied Article 41 of  the 
FRCR, instead of  Article 2. In the second category of  
cases, those that concern disputes arising from share 
transfer, PRC courts should have applied Article 14 of  
the FRCR, instead of  Article 2 of  the FRCR. In the 
third category, a case that concerns the characterization 
issue, the PRC court should have applied either Article 
44 of  the FRCR or Article 14 of  the FRCR instead of  
Article 2. A possibility is to understand the current si-
tuation as a temporary one, as in the case of  a circuit 
split in the U.S.—where different circuit courts ruled 
differently, and to wait for the Supreme People’s Court 
to rule on the issue. Another possibility is to understand 
the contemporary PRC legal system as unconducive to 
prediction.
Weighing the pros and cons of  standards and rules is 
not the purpose of  this article; nor does an abstract eva-
luation provide a helpful guide to legislators, lawyers, or 
judges. Instead, these concepts are unnecessary abstrac-
tions. It may seem reasonable to distill the abstract idea 
that the most-significant-relationship doctrine animates 
the whole field of  choice of  law, and doing so may serve 
the purpose of  placing an emphasis on “applying” the 
law—albeit a standard, the most-significant-relationship 
doctrine in Article 2, as opposed to making policy de-
cisions.71 I respectfully contend that the abstract idea 
itself, however, should be refined to suit the needs of  
a contemporary society for certainty and predictability. 
As stated earlier, in a number of  areas of  law, the most-
-significant-relationship doctrine has been transformed 
into specific choice-of-law rules.72 Although the most-
70 See e.g., the Web site of  Stanford Law School, China Guiding 
Cases Project, Available in: <https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/>. Ac-
cess: Feb. 16, 2016; AHL, Björn. Retaining judicial professionalism: 
the new guiding cases mechanism of  the supreme people’s court. 
China Quarterly, v. 217, p. 121-139, Mar. 2014, 
71 Scholars and practitioners in the PRC after the Cultural Revolu-
tion have reasons to emphasize legal reasoning over policy decisions. 
Put differently, policy decisions have to be made in the political sys-
tem of  the PRC. See e.g., Political Governance in China (Tony Saich 
ed., 2014); Politics in China: An Introduction (William A. Joseph 
ed., 2d ed., 2014).
72 Put another way, the most-significant-relationship doctrine 
-significant-relationship doctrine has been incorporated 
in Section 6 of  the Restatement (Second),73 Reese, the 
Reporter, in the Restatement and in academic articles, 
cautiously argues for the need to develop precise ru-
les over time. To be sure, Singer holds that there is a 
need for a fallback rule,74 but he does not argue that 
the most-significant-relationship doctrine, as stipulated 
by Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR, should be that 
fallback rule. In addition, Singer argues for the candor 
about the policies involved, which can become masked 
by the ostensibly mechanical application of  the most-
-significant-relationship doctrine as stipulated by Article 
2, Section 2.
4. FInAl consIderAtIons
Examining a statutory law and its application in the 
People’s Republic of  China, this article questions the 
idea that standards are an easier way for a jurisdiction to 
create “better law” and cautions against the questiona-
ble exercise of  official discretion ostensibly authorized 
by law in the form of  legal standards. Article 2, Section 
2 of  the PRC’s conflict-of-law statute, effective since 
2011, sets the most-significant-relationship doctrine as 
the fallback rule for the entire field of  the choice of  law. 
Although some scholars have considered Article 2, Sec-
tion 2 an important innovation, this article demonstra-
tes that, when the PRC courts applied it, the reasoning 
behind the judgments were not without problems. This 
Article asks the following question: Absent persuasive 
reasoning, how is the current application of  Article 2, 
Section 2 different from a questionable exercise of  offi-
cial discretion ostensibly authorized by Article 2, Sec-
tion 2?
Some may argue that, given the fact that the most-
-significant-relationship doctrine as the fallback rule 
(Article 2, Section 2) has, in reality, been applied to very 
few cases in the PRC, it is not worth serious investi-
gation. I respectfully disagree. Article 2, Section 2 was 
a statutory rule that the PRC government purports to 
may be considered another way to describe the rationale for “depart-
ing from forum law.” See e.g WEINBERG, Louise. On Departing 
from Forum Law. Mercer Law Review, v. 35, n. 595, p. 600-635, 1984.
73 It should be noted that Article 2, Section 2 of  the FRCR of  
the PRC is different in scope from Section 6 of  the Restatement 
(Second).
74 See SINGER, supra note 54.
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take seriously. As it is a choice-of-law rule of  the PRC, 
albeit a fallback one, the business and society outside 
of  the PRC have to take Article 2, Section 2 serious-
ly since they are likely to encounter its application in 
PRC courts or arbitration panels75 that apply the PRC’s 
choice-of-law rules.
In addition, some may argue that forum law—i.e., 
the law of  the place where litigation occurs—should 
always govern and that, therefore, the choice-of-law 
reasoning set out by the PRC courts does not matter 
much. This argument ostensibly “helps” PRC scholars 
and courts, but they are more likely to oppose it. Howe-
ver brief  the reasoning of  a PRC judgment is, reasoning 
is an element of  the judgments delivered by the PRC 
courts, and reasoning will remain essential to the judg-
ments that the PRC courts deliver. Absent proper and 
persuasive reasoning, a “judgment” can simply become 
a command of  the powerful, which is contrary to the 
very idea of  “law” itself. To be sure, the Chinese Com-
munist Party remains influential in the PRC courts76 and 
the “socialist” rule of  law purports to be different from 
other conceptions of  “rule of  law.”77 Even though the 
reasoning offered in the judgments of  the cases exa-
mined in this article does not accord squarely with the 
wordings and structure of  the FRCR, the PRC courts 
do try to provide a rationale for their judgments.
The FRCR is a statute enacted by the People’s Re-
public of  China, but it does not apply in either Hong 
Kong or Macau,78 nor does the FRCR have legal effects 
on Taiwan.79 At first glance, people outside the PRC 
75 See e.g., FAN, Kun, Arbitration in China: a legal and cultural 
analysis. Hong Kong: Chinese Univesity, Feb. 2013.
76 See e.g., ZHU, Suli. The party and the courts, in judicial independence 
in China: lessons for global rule of  law promotion. Cambridge: Ran-
dal Peerenboom, 2010.
77 See e.g., CHEN, Albert H. Y. Toward a legal enlightenment: dis-
cussions in contemporary China on the rule of  law. Pacific Basin Law 
Journal, v. 17, n. 2-3, p. 125-146, 1999. p. 136
78 See e.g., CHEN, Albert H. Y.; CHEUNG, Anne S. Y. Debating 
rule of  law in the Hong Kong special administrative region, 1997-
2002. In: PEERENBOOM, Randall (Ed.). Asian discourses of  rule 
of  law: theories and implementation of  rule of  law in twelve Asian 
Countries, France and the U.S. 250. London: Routledge, 2004. p. 
250-285; DELISLE, Jacques; LANE, Kevin P. Hong Kong’s End-
game and the Rule of  Law (I): The Struggle over Institutions and 
Values in the Transition to Chinese Rule. University of  Pennsylvania 
Journal of  International Law, v. 18, n. 1, p. 195-254, Spring 1997; DEL-
ISLE, Jacques; LANE, Kevin P. Hong Kong’s endgame and the rule 
of  law (II): the battle over the people and the business community 
in the transition to chinese rule. Journal of  International Law, v. 25, 
n .4, p. 1525-1746, 2004.
79 See e.g., CHI, Chung, supra note 1. See also, CHI, Chung. Conflict 
may seem to have no interest in the development and 
application of  the FRCR by the PRC courts. To the sur-
prise of  casual observers, however, the private-law con-
sequences of  cross-border activities such as business, 
marriage, and adoption to a significant extent depend 
on the proper functioning of  foreign legal systems.80 
It takes time and effort to develop “better law,” and it 
takes no less time and effort to identify better law when 
adjudicating a choice-of-law situation. There is no easier 
way to have better law.
of  Law Rules between China and Taiwan and Their Significance. 
Journal of  Civil Rights and Economic Development, v. 22, n. 3, p. 559-594, 
Dec. 2008.
80 See e.g., COHEN, Jerome A. Settling International Business 
Disputes with China: Then and Now. Cornell International Law Jounal, 
v. 47, p. 555-568, 2014; MNOOKIN, Robert H.; KORNHAUSER, 
Lewis. Bargaining in the shadow of  the law: the case of  divorce. The 
Yale Law Journal, v. 88, n. 5, p. 950-997, Apr. 1979; CHI, Chung. The 
judicial determination of  the validity of  arbitration agreements in 
the people’s Republic of  China. Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, 
v. 3, n. 1, p.99-122, May 2010.
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